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Recent studies show that, while losses loom larger than equivalent non-gains, gains 
loom larger than equivalent non-losses. This finding, at odds with the loss aversion 
principle, has been interpreted within the framework of regulatory focus theory. In 
this study, we explore the causal effect of regulatory focus on the asymmetric 
perception of gains vs non-losses and losses vs non-gains. We examine the perceived 
effects of both hypothetical and actual changes in monetary wealth, while 
orthogonally manipulating framing, valence, and regulatory focus. We find a 
significant interaction between the three factors. The gain vs non-loss asymmetry in 
perceived satisfaction is stronger in promotion focus, while the loss vs non-gain 
asymmetry in perceived dissatisfaction is stronger in prevention focus. The results 
suggest that the effects of incentives framed in terms of (non)gains and (non)losses, 
depend on their congruence with the individual’s motivational state. 
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1.  Introduction 
In their prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed a value 
function to represent the subjective perception of changes in wealth. The value 
function is assumed to be concave above the reference point and convex below it, so 
that the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with their magnitude. A 
second salient characteristic of the value function is that, departing from the reference 
point, it is steeper for losses than for gains. The asymmetric shape of the value 
function accounts for the loss aversion principle (LA), which states that losses loom 
larger than gains. According to LA, the subjective disutility associated to an outcome 
coded as a loss should be larger than the subjective disutility associated to the same 
outcome when coded as a non-gain. Consistently with this prediction, Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) found that, in violation of the normative model, a price 
increase (loss) is judged as more unfair than a cancellation of a former price reduction 
(non-gain), despite the two changes in wealth being identical.  
As pointed out by Liberman, Idson, and Higgins (2005), the same principle of 
LA could be applied to positive outcomes. Following Kahneman et al.’s reasoning, a 
non-loss should be perceived more strongly than an equivalent gain. Therefore, for 
example, a decision-maker experiencing the cancellation of a former price increase 
(non-loss) should perceive higher subjective utility than when experiencing a 
corresponding price reduction (gain). Liberman et al. (2005) tested this prediction in 
three studies, where they manipulated the valence (positive vs. negative) and the 
framing (gain vs. loss) of the outcome. The results for the negative outcome 
conditions replicated the finding that losses are perceived more strongly than non-
gains. However, in the positive outcome conditions, the results indicated that gains 
are perceived more strongly than non-losses, contrary to the LA predictions. These 
results, in line with previous findings on emotional reaction (Idson, Liberman, and 
Higgins, 2000), have been interpreted using the framework of regulatory focus theory 
(Higgins, 1997, 2000). 
Regulatory focus theory starts from the functionalist assumption that 
nurturance and security are two fundamental needs for the human being. It proposes 
the existence of two distinct regulatory systems concerning either nurturance or 
security: promotion and prevention. Promotion and prevention states differ with 
respect to both strategic inclination and goals. The promotion focus is related to 
hopes, aspirations and nurturance needs, and involves sensitivity to positive outcome 
and inclination to approach. On the other hand, the prevention focus is related to 
duties and security needs, and involves sensitivity to negative outcome and 
inclination to avoidance. Generally, people differ in their chronic regulatory focus, 
thus being individually more prone to either promotion or prevention states (Higgins 
and Silberman, 1998). However, the regulatory focus system may also be activated by 
the context or by specific tasks and stimuli.  
The regulatory focus activation can explain the asymmetry in the perception 
of gains vs non-losses and losses vs non-gains (Liberman et al., 2005; Idson et al., 
2000; Idson et al., 2004). More specifically, the rationale proposed by these authors is 
that a loss framing (loss and non-loss conditions) activates a prevention focus,   3
whereas a gain framing (gain and non-gain conditions) activates a promotion focus. 
This implies that negative outcomes are perceived more strongly in a loss framing 
and positive outcomes are perceived more strongly in a gain framing. As argued by 
Idson et al. (2000; p. 254), in dealing with a positive outcome, the pleasure of 
promotion success (gain) should be more intense than that of prevention success 
(non-loss); vice versa, in facing a negative outcome, the pain of prevention failure 
(loss) should be more intense than that of promotion failure (non-gain). Thus, the 
effect of framing on regulatory focus could explain why losses loom larger than non-
gains and gains loom larger than non-losses. 
The regulatory focus hypothesis leads to an intriguing interpretation of the 
evidence presented in Liberman et al. (2005). However, alongside this motivational 
perspective there is also a purely cognitive explanation of the results, based on the 
“feature-positive” effect (Jenkins and Sainsbury, 1970). The feature-positive effect 
suggests that people have more difficulty in processing information that is absent than 
information that is present. This bias has been described in similar forms in a variety 
of subjects, ages, experimental settings and cognitive processes, such as visual search 
(e.g., Hearst, 1991), probability learning (Estes, Allmeyer, and Reder, 1967), 
evaluative judgment (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978), recognition (Agostinelli, Sherman, 
Fazio, and Hearst, 1986), and hypothesis development (Klayman, 1995). Under the 
assumption that non-loss and non-gain can be interpreted as an absent feature, while 
loss and gain as a present feature, the tendency to underweight the absent feature 
could provide an explanation of the evidence.  
In previous studies (Liberman et al., 2005; Idson et al., 2000; Shah, Higgins, 
Friedman, 1998) regulatory focus was not manipulated independently of outcome 
valence (positive vs. negative) and framing (loss vs. gain). Therefore, its role cannot 
be disentangled from that of other factors, such as the presence/absence asymmetry. 
On the other hand, the regulatory focus has been effectively manipulated in some 
studies on the gain and loss asymmetry. For instance, Halamish, Liberman, Higgins 
and Idson (2008) manipulated regulatory focus to assess the effects on discounting 
over uncertainty for gains and losses. Similarly to the present research, Zhao and 
Pechmann (2007) manipulated the individual’s regulatory focus to investigate the 
impact of persuasive campaigns when the individual’s motivational state, the 
message’s regulatory focus and the message frame act synergically.  
The interpretation proposed by Liberman et al. (2005) is based on the assumed 
relationship between framing and regulatory focus (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; 
Higgins, Roney, Crowe, and Hymes, 1994; Higgins and Tykocinski, 1992). 
Accordingly, framing an outcome in terms of gain or non-gain should lead to a 
promotion focus activation, whereas framing it in terms of loss or non-loss should 
imply a prevention focus activation (Shah et al., 1998). Nevertheless, from a 
theoretical standpoint, the motivational system could be conceived as independent of 
both frame and outcome valence. A focus of promotion or prevention may be induced 
by previous experiences independently of the context-specific stimuli, or it could be 
an individual chronic state (Higgins and Silberman, 1998). Moreover, there might be 
situations in which it is the negative outcome to induce approach behavior. Studies of 
decision making provide evidence of a “break even” effect (Thaler and Johnson,   4
1990), whereby risk taking is facilitated by previous loss. Consistently, recent 
neuroscientific evidence shows that decision-makers tend to choose riskier options 
when primed with loss trials than with gain trials (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). 
The present study aims at identifying the causal impact of regulatory focus on 
the asymmetric perception of gains vs non-losses and losses vs non-gains. To this 
purpose, we investigate experimentally the perceived effects of changes in monetary 
wealth, while orthogonally manipulating three factors: framing (gain/loss), valence 
(positive/negative), and regulatory focus (promotion/prevention). This enables us to 
directly test the moderation effect of regulatory focus on the interaction between 
framing and outcome valence. More specifically, we hypothesize:  
 
1.  Regulatory focus, framing and valence act synergically. 
2.  For positive outcomes, the asymmetry in perceived satisfaction between a 
gain and an equivalent non-loss is stronger in promotion than in prevention 
focus. 
3.  For negative outcomes, the asymmetry in perceived dissatisfaction between a 
loss and an equivalent non-gain is stronger in prevention than in promotion 
focus. 
 
We test for the predicted three-way interaction effect in two experimental 
studies based on a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) X 2 (outcome 
valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (framing: gain vs. loss) between-subjects 
randomly assigned factorial design. In the first, we examine the perceived effects of 
the outcomes a hypothetical (non)gain-(non)loss scenario. In the second, we examine 
the perceived effects of the actual (non)gain-(non)loss monetary outcome of a 
gambling task. Therefore, the present study examines not only the anticipated 
(un)pleasantness and emotional reactions to hypothetical outcomes, but also the 
perceived effects of actual monetary outcomes.
1 The paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 describes the first experimental study, based on a fictitious scenario. 
Section 3 presents the second study, where participants experience actual monetary 
outcomes. Section 4 provides a discussion of the findings and concludes.  
 
 





The sample consisted of 200 undergraduate students (81% females) from 
different backgrounds at the University of Milan-Bicocca, who volunteered to 
                                                  
1 The comparison between virtual and actual outcomes is important, as recent research has highlighted 
that loss aversion occurs more reliably for anticipated outcomes than for experienced ones (Gilbert, 
Morewedge, Risen, and Wilson, 2004; Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, and Gilbert, 2006; see also 
Harinck, VanDijk, Van Beest, and Mersmann, 2010).   5
participate without any monetary reward. Age was between 19 and 41 years (M = 
22.18; SD = 3.54) 
 
2.1.2. Materials and procedures 
Participants were approached in various libraries at the University of Milan-
Bicocca. They were asked to participate in a role-play study and those who accepted 
were given a paper-and-pencil questionnaire to fill out. On the cover page, 
participants’ personal data were collected. In the first part of the booklet, the scenario 
was presented: the participant was asked to imagine a situation in which she decided 
to go to a gambling house with some friends. The regulatory focus of participants was 
manipulated through the description of the scenario: half of the sample was induced 
to think that the money in play had been saved for buying school textbooks 
(prevention condition); the other half of the sample was told that possible gambling 
gains could be used to buy something they really desired (promotion condition).  
After presenting the scenario, the first game was proposed. An urn contains 
100 marbles: 50 white, 30 black and 20 gray marbles. One marble is to be drawn 
randomly from the urn. The participant can bet €25 on one color according to the 
following rules: if she bets on white and wins, she receives €50; if she bets on black 
and wins, she receives €100; if she bets on gray and wins, she receives €162.50; if she 
does not bet on the right color, she receives €0. Participants were then asked whether 
they would be willing to bet and, if so, on which color. Since the different choices 
implied different risk propensity, we used this choice as a manipulation check, in 
order to assess the effect of the regulatory focus manipulation. 
In the following section of the questionnaire, a second hypothetical situation 
was presented in four different versions according to the experimental condition. In 
gain condition, participants were virtually endowed with €80 and were told they had 
gained €20 at the roulette, thus obtaining €100. In non-gain condition, participants 
were virtually endowed with €80 and were told they had gained €20 at the roulette, 
but the bet had been invalidated for a formal reason, so that they obtained €80. In loss 
condition, participants were virtually endowed with €100 and were told they had lost 
€20 at the roulette, thus obtaining €80. In non-loss condition, participants were 
virtually endowed with €100 and were said they had lost €20 at the roulette, but the 
bet had been invalidated for a formal reason, so that they finally obtained €100. 
Hence, the experiment consisted of a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. 
prevention) X 2 (outcome valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (framing: gain vs. loss) 
between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight 
experimental groups. Finally, participants were asked to evaluate how they would feel 
about the outcome on a scale ranging from 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good). At the end 




2.2.1. Manipulation check 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the regulatory focus manipulation, we 
analyzed the gambling intentions in the first game. To this aim, we assumed the four   6
options to be along a continuum of risk propensity and we assigned a score 
accordingly: 0 to the choice of not betting; 1 to the choice of betting on white; 2 to the 
choice of betting on black; 3 to the choice of betting on gray. A Mann-Whitney non-
parametric test indicated that, consistently with our purpose, participants in 
prevention condition were more risk averse (M =2.05, SD = 0.99) than participants in 
promotion condition (M =2.44, SD = 0.94), z = -2.94, p = .004. 
 
2.2.2. Satisfaction 
Having verified the effects of our focus manipulation, we tested the 
hypotheses about the moderator role of the regulatory focus on the relation between 
outcome valence and framing in affecting the individual’s perception of gains and 
losses. The satisfaction item was submitted to a 2 (Regulatory focus: promotion vs. 
prevention) × 2 (Outcome: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Framing: gain vs. loss) analysis 
of variance (ANOVA), with all the factors varying between participants. The 
statistical analysis revealed an expected main effect of valence, F(1, 192) = 125.76, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .39: participants who obtained a positive outcome were more satisfied 
(M =5.24, SD = 1.10) than those who received a negative outcome (M =3.42, SD = 
1.23). In line with Liberman et al. (2005), we also found a main effect of framing, 
F(1, 192) = 6.06, p = .01, ηp
2 = .03: when the outcome was framed in terms of gain, 
the experience was perceived as more positive (M =4.57, SD = 1.43) than when the 
outcome was framed in terms of loss (M =4.06, SD = 1.49).  
Figure 1 displays average satisfaction scores by experimental condition. As 
illustrated, the effects of regulatory focus are consistent with the hypothesis. The 
ANOVA yielded a three-way interaction between regulatory focus, outcome and 
framing, F(1, 192) = 6.36, p = .01, ηp
2 = .03. In positive valence condition, the results 
of the 2 (Regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) × 2 (Framing: gain vs. loss) 
ANOVA showed a two-way interaction between focus and framing, F(1, 95) = 3.91, 
p = .05, ηp
2 = .04. When the outcome was positive and participants were in promotion 
focus, gain tended to loom larger (M = 5.61, SD = 0.83) than non-loss (M = 4.69, SD 
= 1.44), t(52) = 2.84, p = .007, d = .78. But when participants were in prevention 
condition, gain (M = 5.36, SD = 0.91) and non-loss (M = 5.30, SD = 0.98) had 
comparable effects on the level of satisfaction,  t(43) = 0.21, p = .83, d = .06. In 
negative valence condition, the 2 (Regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) × 2 
(Framing: gain vs. loss) ANOVA did not yield a significant interaction effect, F (1, 
97) = 2.63, p = .10, ηp
2 = .03. However, the pattern of results was specular to that in 
positive valence condition. In particular, when the outcome was negative and 
participants were in prevention focus, loss led to lower satisfaction (M = 3.26, SD = 
1.23) than non-gain (M = 3.96, SD = 1.37), t(49) = 1.92, p  = .06, d  = .54. In 
promotion condition, loss (M = 3.28, SD = 1.21) and non-gain (M = 3.20, SD = 1.00) 
had similar effects on satisfaction (t(48) = 0.25, p = .80, d = .07). 
Analyses did not reveal any other significant effect, Fs (1, 92) < 2.87, ps > 
.09. 
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Figure 1. Average satisfaction score by experimental condition,  Study 1 
 
Note: Individual satisfaction with a positive or a negative fictitious outcome, framed 
in terms of loss or gain, as a function of regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention). 
 




3.1.1. Participants  
One hundred sixty-two students (46.3% females) from different backgrounds 
at the University of Milan Bicocca participated in the study for monetary rewards, 
with age ranging between 18 and 31 (M = 22.64; SD = 1.96). Participants were 
recruited by e-mail, using a list of voluntary potential candidates, with an invitation to 
participate in an experiment on economic behavior with actual monetary incentives. 
They earned 5 or 15 euro, depending on the outcome of the experimental task.  
 
3.1.2. Materials and procedures 
We implemented eight sessions lasting around 30 min each. The sessions 
were conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of 
Milan Bicocca. The experiment was run using the experimental software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Upon arrival, participants were informed that the experiment 
would be composed of three different parts: a questionnaire, the experimental task, 
and another questionnaire.  
The first part consisted of the manipulation of the regulatory focus and 
manipulation check. Participants were asked to write a short essay, within a 10 min 
time span, on a topic that varied according to the experimental condition: in the 
promotion condition they were asked to describe their current hopes and aspirations 
for the future; in the prevention condition they were asked to describe their current   8
duties, obligations and fears for the future (see e.g., Halamish et al., 2008, for an 
analogous procedure). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions (promotion or prevention). After completing the essay, 
participants answered 16 question items drawn from the regulatory focus 
questionnaire (Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda, 2002) translated into Italian. Designed 
to assess chronic prevention or promotion goals, the scale was used here as a 
manipulation check to evaluate the temporary regulatory focus after the experimental 
manipulation. Participants evaluated each item (e.g., “I am focused on preventing 
negative events in my life”; “I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the 
future”) on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (absolutely no) to 7 (absolutely yes). The 
complete list of items is reported in the Appendix. 
At the end of the questionnaire, the second part started. The task consisted of 
guessing the outcome of a coin toss (heads or tails). Participants were instructed that 
they would be paid on the basis of their guess of the outcome of the coin toss. The 
scenario was manipulated by framing (gain and loss). In the gain framing (gain and 
non-gain conditions), each participant received the following information:  
 
“You have an endowment of 5 euro. You can win 10 euro on the basis of a 
coin toss. You have to guess the outcome of the toss (heads or tails). We 
will then flip a coin.  
o  If your guess is correct, you will win 10 euro; therefore, your total 
earnings will be 15 euro.  
o  If your guess is not correct, you will not win 10 euro; therefore, 
your total earnings will be 5 euro.” 
 
In the loss framing (loss and non-loss conditions), each participant received the 
following information: 
 
“You have an endowment of 15 euro. You can lose 10 euro on the basis of a 
coin toss. You have to guess the outcome of the toss (heads or tails). We 
will then flip a coin.  
o  If your guess is correct, you will not lose 10 euro; therefore, your 
total earnings will be 15 euro.  
o  If your guess is not correct, you will lose 10 euro; therefore, your 
total earnings will be 5 euro.” 
 
In order to ensure public knowledge, instructions were distributed and read 
aloud. Control questions were distributed to ensure understanding of the experimental 
task and procedures. Answers were privately checked and, if necessary, individually 
explained to the participants, and the task did not start until all subjects had answered 
all questions correctly. Then, participants materially received their endowments in 
euro and made their choice. The coin was tossed, and the results were displayed on 
screen. Depending on the outcome of the guess, participants in the gain (non-gain) 
condition received (did not receive) €10 in addition to their initial endowment of €5; 
participants in the loss (non-loss) condition had to (did not have to) return €10 from 
their initial endowment of €15. Note that the final outcome is identical across framing   9
conditions in both positive and negative valence conditions (gain vs non-loss and loss 
vs non-gain). This rules out any effects of differences in the end state. Overall, the 
experimental design consisted of a 2 (regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) X 2 
(framing: gain vs. loss) X 2 (outcome valence: positive vs. negative) between-
subjects design.  
Following the gambling task, the third part of the experiment was 
administered, consisting of an on-line questionnaire. Participants were first asked a 
number of questions asking to evaluate the experimental task. In particular, three 
questions focused on participants’ satisfaction with the outcome of their choice: (1) 
“How satisfied are you with the outcome of your bet?”; (2) “How lucky do you 
feel?”; (3) “How did fate treat you?”. Answers were given on a scale ranging from -9 
(very unsatisfied/not at all/very badly) to +9 (very satisfied/completely/very nicely). 0 
indicated the midpoint of the scale. Then, socio-demographical data were collected. 




3.2.1. Manipulation check 
In order to assess the effects of the regulatory focus manipulation, we 
analyzed the results for the regulatory focus scale. After reversing the items of 
prevention and assessing the scale reliability (Cronbach’s  = 0.60), we computed a 
composite score. The t-test revealed that, consistently with our purpose, participants 
in prevention condition tended to be less focused on promotion (M =4.70, SD = 0.51) 
than participants in promotion condition (M =4.85, SD = 0.55), t(160) = 1.87, p = 
.06, d = .28. 
 
3.2.2. Satisfaction 
We computed a satisfaction composite score averaging the three relevant items of the 
questionnaire (Cronbach’s  = 0.92). The satisfaction index was submitted to a 2 
(Regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) × 2 (Outcome: positive vs. negative) × 
2 (Framing: gain vs. loss) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with all the factors varying 
between participants. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the analysis reveals the main effect of valence, 
F(1, 154) = 433.22, p  < .001, ηp
2  = .74: participants who experience a positive 
outcome are more satisfied (M =7.08, SD = 2.39) than participants who experience a 
negative outcome (M =-3.63, SD = 4.04).  
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Figure 2. Average satisfaction score by experimental condition,  Study 2 
 
Note: Individual satisfaction with positive or negative actual monetary outcome, framed in terms of 
loss or gain, as a function of regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention) 
 
Consistently with the results of study 1, the ANOVA yields a three-way 
interaction between regulatory focus, outcome and framing, F(1, 154) = 6.58, p = .01, 
ηp
2  = .04. In negative valence condition, the results of the 2 (Regulatory focus: 
promotion vs. prevention) × 2 (Framing: gain vs. loss) ANOVA show neither a main 
effect of focus, F(1, 75) = .08, p = .77, nor of framing, F(1, 75) = .71, p = .40. The 
absence of main effects is signified by a two-way interaction between focus and 
framing, F(1, 75) = 6.84, p = .01, ηp
2 = .08. When confronted with a loss, in line with 
the hypotheses, participants in prevention condition (M =-5.25, SD = 3.08) tend to be 
less satisfied than participants in promotion condition (M =-2.67, SD = 5.24), t(34) = 
1.84, p = .07, d = .60; vice versa, when confronted with a non-gain, participants in 
promotion condition (M =-4.24, SD = 3.28) tend to be less satisfied than participants 
in prevention condition (M =-2.17, SD = 4.09), t(41) = 1.83, p = .07, d = .56.  As a 
consequence, when the outcome is negative and participants are in prevention focus, 
loss looms larger than non-gain, t(39) = 2.71, p = .01, d = .85. This difference is no 
longer significant when participants are in promotion condition, t(36) = 1.14, p = .26, 
d = .36. 
In positive valence condition, the 2 (Regulatory focus: promotion vs. 
prevention) × 2 (Framing: gain vs. loss) ANOVA shows neither main effects nor an 
interaction effect, Fs(1, 79) < 1.35, p > .25. Participants’ satisfaction when dealing 
with a gain in promotion (M = 7.63, SD = 1.79) and in prevention condition (M = 
6.70, SD = 2.08) or when confronted with a non-loss in promotion (M = 7.18, SD = 
2.53) and in prevention condition (M = 6.87, SD = 2.92) did not differ one from the 
other, ps > .05. Thus, the analysis reveals an asymmetry between the positive and the 
negative outcome conditions. The data also show a two-way interaction between 
focus and frame F(1, 154) = 3.87, p = .05, ηp
2 = .02. Given the asymmetry between   11
positive and negative valence conditions, this finding reflects the interaction between 
focus and framing in the negative outcome condition. Thus, the difference between 
loss and gain in prevention focus condition (Mloss =0.96, SDloss = 6.80; Mgain = 2.15, 
SDgain = 5.53), p = .04, becomes negligible in prevention focus condition (Mloss = 
3.34, SDloss = 6.15; Mgain = 0.93, SDgain = 6.54), p = .44.  
The three-way ANOVA did not reveal any other significant effect, Fs (1, 
154) < 0.73, ps >.39. 
 
4. Discussion 
According to the LA principle (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991), 
people should perceive greater disutility when facing a loss than a non-gain. 
Therefore, for example, we should experience more disutility when facing a price 
increase (loss) than when not obtaining an expected discount (non-gain). But what 
happens when we believe to have lost a bill and then find it in a pocket (non-loss) as 
opposed to when we find a bill in the street (gain)? Generally, and contrary to the LA 
principle, subjects experience more pleasure in the latter situation than in the former 
one. Recent research on the asymmetric perception of loss vs non-gain and gain vs 
non-loss (Idson et al., 2000; Liberman et al., 2005) has provided empirical support to 
this idea. In fact, although these studies confirmed the LA predictions when the 
outcome was negative (loss looms larger than non-gain), they revealed the opposite 
pattern when the outcome was positive (gain looms larger than non-loss). The authors 
interpreted the results within the framework of regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997, 
1998). Since loss and non-loss information would be related to a prevention focus, 
whereas gain and non-gain information to a promotion focus, the motivational factor 
and the outcome information would work synergically thus strengthening loss over 
non-gain, on one hand, and gain over non-loss, on the other hand. 
The present contribution aimed at further exploring this explanation, trying to 
disentangle the role of the regulatory focus from that of the other variables involved 
in the process, namely the framing and the outcome valence. The analysis of the 
possible moderating role of regulatory focus is relevant for at least two reasons: first, 
the asymmetry between gain vs. non-loss and loss vs. non-gain is compatible with 
other explanations based on cognitive aspects (e.g.“feature-positive” effect, Jenkins 
and Sainsbury, 1970); second, the activated regulatory focus could be independent 
from the framing and the valence of the contingent outcome. 
Therefore, we conducted two studies where the regulatory focus of subjects, 
the valence of the outcome and the framing of the task were orthogonally 
manipulated. Moreover, while in Study 1 participants were presented with a 
hypothetical outcome and we investigated its impact on the anticipated effects, in 
Study 2 participants experienced actual monetary gains or losses. In line with the 
hypotheses, the results of the two studies revealed a significant interaction between 
frame, valence and regulatory focus. More explicitly, gains produced more 
satisfaction than equivalent non-losses in  promotion than in prevention focus, while 
losses elicited more dissatisfaction than non-gains in prevention than in promotion 
focus. Overall, the pattern showed a difference between gain- and loss-framed 
outcomes only when there was a positive matching between regulatory focus, framing   12
and valence. More specifically, in Study 2, although the pattern is qualitatively 
consistent with the hypotheses, the results showed an asymmetry between the 
negative and the positive outcome, as the interaction was significant only in positive 
outcome conditions. This finding could be explained by a ceiling effect: when the 
outcome is positive, earning 15-euro leads participants to high levels of satisfaction 
independently of the focus and framing manipulation. Another related explanation is 
the role played by individuals’ expectations about the outcome. Given that 
participants in Study 2 expect to earn a monetary payoff, the (unanticipated) negative 
outcome could be cognitively more salient than the (anticipated) positive outcome. To 
the extent that the positive outcome is viewed as the status quo, it is less likely to 
elicit psychological effects than the negative outcome.         
From a theoretical point of view, the results suggest that regulatory focus is 
not always likely to engender a gain-nonloss asymmetry (Liberman et al., 2005): 
when the individual orientation does not fit with the stimuli, the effect of regulatory 
focus is even likely to nullify this asymmetry. The idea that the outcome worth can be 
enhanced by “fit” is in line with previous studies on regulatory focus (Higgins, 2002). 
For instance, Higgins (2002) proposed the outcome-value postulate according to 
which value would derive from a congruence between the outcome and the 
individual’s motivational orientation. Thus, promotion-focused decision-makers 
would evaluate promotion-relevant outcomes as more important, whereas decision-
makers in prevention state would evaluate prevention-relevant outcomes as more 
important. This implies that not only the same value can be weighed differently 
because of its frame (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991), but that the same 
outcome can have different subjective value for different people, or for the same 
person in different situations, depending on their motivational state, goals, and 
regulatory orientation (Higgins, 2002). In addition, conceiving the regulatory focus as 
an exogenous variable allowed us to conceptually separate the role of the hedonic 
principle from some more cognitive factors, such as the feature-positive effect 
(Agostinelli, Sherman, Fazio, and Hearst, 1986; Jenkins and Sainsbury, 1970). Given 
the moderating role of regulatory focus, future studies could investigate more directly 
some other hypotheses on the factors (cognitive or motivational) leading to the gain-
nonloss asymmetry.          
The attention to the moderating role of regulatory focus on the relation 
between framing and valence and the motivational perspective on the process analysis 
(e.g., Halamish et al., 2008) could also have some interesting implications. One of the 
possible implications concerns incentives. As argued by Shah et al. (1998), incentives 
may adequately motivate behaviour depending on their congruence with individuals’ 
needs and goals. Accordingly, the authors demonstrated that the regulatory focus 
moderates the relation between incentive and performance: thus, differently from 
prevention-focused individuals, promotion-focused individuals perform better when 
incentives are framed in terms of accomplishment (promotion congruent) as opposed 
to safety (prevention congruent). Similarly, previous studies showed people to be 
more willing to make efforts to approach gains than non-losses or to avoid losses than 
non-gains (Idson et al., 2004; Liberman et al., 2005). Our results suggest that when 
the incentives are framed in terms of gain, non-loss, loss or non-gain, their   13
perception, and the consequent effects on performance, could depend on the 
congruence with the individual’s motivational state. The same rationale could be used 
for the investigation of positive and negative feedback efficacy (e.g., Förster, Grant, 
Idson, and Higgins, 2001).  
A second possible implication is about communication. Our results suggest 
that the presentation of an outcome in terms of gain rather than non-loss could be 
more effective for individual judgment and behaviour, but only when the individual is 
in a promotion state; if the individual is in a temporary or chronic prevention state, 
this manipulation can be expected to fail. This rationale is consistent with the work of 
Zhao and Pechmann (2007) on advertising messages, where the authors demonstrated 
information to be more persuasive when the individual’s regulatory focus, the 
message regulatory focus and the framing act synergically. Therefore, when an 
individual is promotion-focused, she is more strongly affected by a positive and gain-
framed message; on the other hand, when an individual is prevention-focused, she is 
more strongly affected by a negative and loss-framed message. 
Future research could apply the present experimental paradigm, based on an 
orthogonal manipulation of regulatory focus, outcome valence and framing, to related 
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1. I am focused on preventing negative events in my life 
2. I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and obligations. 
3. I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations. 
4. I often think about the person I am afraid I might become in the future. 
5. I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the future. 
6. I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future. 
7. I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I fear might happen to me. 
8. I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life. 
9. I am more oriented toward preventing losses than I am toward achieving gains. 
10. I often think about how I will achieve academic success. 
11. I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my academic goals. 
12. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach my “ideal self”—to 
fulfil my hopes, wishes, and aspirations. 
13. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to become the self I “ought” to 
be—to fulfil my duties, responsibilities, and obligations. 
14. In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life. 
15. I often imagine myself experiencing good things that I hope will happen to me. 
16. Overall, I am more oriented toward achieving success than preventing failure. 
 